What was the role of 'consensus' in post-war British politics?

A fundamental issue is that there is no true definition in historical terms of what the word refers to. Are we talking in terms of the electorate, of parties, of the machinery of government or indeed some complicated subsets of all three? The literature describes battle lines on a ‘post-war consensus’ drawn between two groups of historians who both agree that the other party is wrong, without being able explain what they are exactly wrong about.

One argument is what we can call the ‘Sir Humphrey’ theory after the superior and condescending civil servant portrayed in the 1980s BBC sitcoms ‘Yes, Minister’ and  ‘Yes, Prime Minister’.  Part of the conceit behind that programme was that government continues despite politicians rather than because of them.  It is civil servants that draft white papers and grind the actual wheels of governments, mentors to a perpetual turnover of members, Lords and ministers that pass through during their tenure.  Even politicians with the most radical ideas find their ardour blunted by the reality of day-to-day governing.  This theory would suggest that all modern government is, by its very nature, consensus led.

We can also consider something that we may call ‘pragmatic consensus’.  Although frequent changes in the governing party have happened during this period (with not infrequent landslide victories), frequent radical change did not happen.  Perhaps this is an inevitability of modern politics, where a desire to retain power strangles radicalism; leading to a true case of consensus for all the wrong reasons.

A starting point for the consensus debate can usefully be identified as the publication of ‘The Road to 1945’ in 1975 by Paul Addison.  His use of the word to describe the post-war period coincided with the election of Margaret Thatcher to lead the Conservatives, which has been perceived as the ‘end of consensus’. 

The traditional view is explained in several pieces by explanation of what was described as ‘Butskellism’.  This portmanteau term conflated the surnames of Rab Butler and Hugh Gaitskell – suggesting that the Conservative and Labour occupants of the top role at the Treasury were essentially interchangeable.  The term originated in a piece in The Economist but is commonly quoted in explanations of post-war fiscal malaise.

The consensus ends, we are led to believe, when Thatcher arrives and reshapes British politics in her own image. This means that her period in opposition (1975-79) and government (1979-90) marked the end of this cosy agreement between the parties on the basics of policy.  As ever, things are not quite as simple as they seem.  The engine driving Thatcherite economics is recalled as being the final ditching of Keynesian theories and the embrace of monetarism.  This would be true in terms of government, but it is also worth remembering that Labour – in government - did exactly this in 1976, admitting that Keynesian policies were simply driving up inflation without providing the expected increase in employment.

So here, just a year after Thatcher’s election as leader, we see an example of economic consensus from both parties. There are some key points to remember here; consensus can simply be ‘doing the right thing’, so of course parties will agree on certain important themes.  Another layer to unravelling this conundrum is to look at the system of party politics and government at this time.  Whilst some criticised her ‘presidential’ style – an epithet later used describe the Blair governments, perhaps with more validity – Thatcher was, in turn, a member of parliament, party leader and Prime Minister. 

The Conservative party is an umbrella organisation encompassing a wide range of, broadly, right-of-centre views.  When forming a government, a party leader/Prime Minister can only utilise the available members of the upper and lower houses.  These form a hugely disparate political clique – as can be seen from the in-fighting among the various Thatcher cabinets.  It is, therefore, not unlikely that there would be consensus between those on the right of the Labour party and those on the left of the Conservatives.

It is those who find themselves on the margins – either right or left – that can be most critical of consensus.  Since the late 1990s, a one-solution-fits-all party has been convincing some sections of the public that the situation that has held since 1945 of greater integration with Europe is the very thing that is holding the United Kingdom back.  They would argue that the country is literally shackled by consensus – an argument used by the ultimately unsuccessful campaigners for Scottish independence in 2014.

Ultimately, democratic politics is, in its very being, characterised by consensus.  The first-past-the-post system can deliver landslide victories for parties who do not achieve a majority in terms of the popular vote.  Governments that ignore this and tailor their policies simply to those they perceive to be their natural supporters can find themselves in trouble.  In other political systems consensus is simply a way of life – other voting systems throw up coalitions much more often, so people learn to cope. 

Perhaps politicians have too high an opinion of their importance in terms of the governance of a nation.  In recent years Belgium survived for over five years without a functioning legislature and managed not to collapse into anarchy.  The United Kingdom had its own (significantly shorter) period without a hand on the tiller after the inconclusive General Election of 2010 and pulled through admirably. 

The only real conclusion here is that consensus is certainly part of the political process.  In terms of historical debate, however, it can be highlighted by supporters and castigators in equal measure. That is, in itself, a consensus of sorts.

References

Paul Addison, ‘British historians and the debate over the "postwar consensus"’, in Wm. Roger Louis, More Adventures with Britannia (1998), pp. 255-64.
Derek Fraser, ‘The Postwar consensus : a debate not long enough?’, Parliamentary Affairs (2000).
Brian Harrison, ‘The rise, fall and rise of political consensus in Britain since 1940’, History (1999),
Dennis Kavanagh, "The Postwar Consensus," Twentieth Century British History (1992).
Rodney Lowe, ‘The second world war, consensus, and the foundation of the welfare state’, Twentieth Century British History (1990).
Ben Pimlott, Denis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, ‘Is the ‘post-war consensus’ a myth?’, Contemporary Record (1989).

Richard Toye, ‘From 'Consensus' to 'Common Ground' : The Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse’, Journal of Contemporary History (2013)